

SCHOOLS AND SECTS IN JAINA LITERATURE

Being a full account compiled from original sources of the
doctrines and practices of Philosophical School and
Religious Sects mentioned in the canonical
literature of the Jains

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Dedicated to my guru

Principal Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya

In whose character and learning his pupils have seen the
true ideal of Indian scholarship and at whose suggestion
this humble work was undertaken

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ERRATA

At page 4 line 22 and throughout the work the name of the commentator should be read as Śīlāka.

At page 2 line 1 and throughout the work *n* where followed by *k* or *g* in any word should be read as *ñ*.

At page 7 line 21 for <i>thelf</i>			<i>read</i> thief
8	20	Kundaggama	Kuṇḍa
10	17	Maṇibhadra	Maṇi
10	21	snakṭa	snakes
10	30	The Gosāla	Then Gośāla
12	10	das	was
13	99	Tevijja	Tevijja
16	16	nhaṇḍakavāḍikamma	nhaṇḍa layavāḍikamma
26	12	Sākya-putra	Sākya
27	8	Gunarato?	Guṇa

INTRODUCTION

The canonical literature of the Svetambara Jainas contains many references to various philosophical schools and religious sects apparently contemporaneous with itself. Although the canon in the form we have it now is a creation of the Council of Valabhi held in *circa* 454 A C under the presidentship of Devardhiganiin yet the matter contained in it is much older. This Council reduced the text to writing. The first collection was however, made by the Council of Pataliputra which according to Hemacandra met during the reign of Aśoka Maurya. Additions were made no doubt during the subsequent editions but the essentials remained unchanged through the long years of canonical revision which brought with it accretions of extraneous matter. The statements which form the subject matter of discussion in the following pages picture a state of things much earlier than Devardhiganiin's age and earlier even than the Council of Pataliputra.

The beliefs and practices discussed in the Jaina texts were considered heretical from the point of view of the Jainas or the Nirgranthas as they were called in the earlier days and as such it was necessary for them to state and criticise the views and practices of many of those schools and sects. An attempt has been made in the following pages to give a comprehensive account of all these sects and schools. Some works outside the Jaina canon have also been sometimes referred to for the purpose of illustrating the matter contained in the canon. References in the later works of Svetambaras and Digambaras to systems of thought adverse to them have been rejected for the simple reason that they deal with circumstances of later ages influenced by conditions of later times when such works were composed. In many cases parallel references and accounts have been mentioned from the literature of the Buddhists as they and the Jainas having started their career about the same time the former are likely to furnish reliable evidence on matters referred to by the latter both being outside the Brahmanical fold and having a strong critical outlook.

That the time the Jaina canon treats of was one bristling with conflicting views and rival schemes may easily be gathered from such statements as "See there are men who control themselves whilst others

only pretend to be houseless ' The *Acaranga Sutra* one of the oldest of the canonical texts says that To friendly or hostile heretics one should not give alms drink dainties and spices nor do them service Some here are not well instructed as regards the subject of conduct they pronounce opinions Know that all this is without reason '

The *Sutralyanga Sutra* another of the most authoritative texts says These heretics will never be saved some unworthy *sramanas* who hold wrong doctrines are afraid of what is free from danger and are not afraid of real danger ' Some who search after truth and pretend to practise the Law follow the false Law and do not arrive at the right thing

ignorant of what is right and wrong they do not get out of misery they praise their own creed and blame that of their opponents ' In a passage of fierce denunciation it has been said that the heretics will never be saved from the sufferings of the world ' In the *Sthananga Sutra* false belief is spoken as an instrument that causes pain (*micchadamsanasalla*) ' It has been divided into two classes *abhiggaḥya* and *anabhiggaḥya* which Abhayadeva the commentator explains as that proceeding from acceptance of wrong doctrine and that proceeding from other causes In the *Bhagavati* there are frequent mentions of heretical schools and of heretical ascetics who came to question Mahavira The *Jnatadharmakatha Antahkṛtadāsa* and *Praśnavyakarananga Sūtras* also contain occasional references to *micchadamsanasalla*

In the *Upasakadāsa* praising of heretical teachers and intimacy with them have been regarded as offences against the law of right belief ' The animosities of the time are well illustrated by the remark of the newly converted lay disciple Ānanda made to Mahavira Truly Reverend Sir it does not befit me from this day forward to praise and worship any man of a heretical community or any of the devas of a heretical community or any of the objects of reverence to them or without being first addressed by them to address them or converse with them or to give or supply them with food or drink except it be by the command of the King or the community or any powerful man or deva or one's own elders or by the exigencies of living ' Frequently does Mahāvira

Acār 9 I: 72 I: 34 I: 63 with a slight variation in I: 72

Ibid I: 113

Sūtr S I: 25-10

It 3 I: 15-23

Ibid II: 79-81

Sūtr 9: 148 *Bhag* I: 63

Up 34.5 II

Ibid 158

refer to the need of refuting heretical doctrines. Surely venerable companions, says Mahavira to his disciples, if those servants of the *Sramana* who are householders living among householders refute the theories of heretics, then much more venerable companions must the *Nirgrantha* ascetics who are students of the sacred collection of the twelve *Angas* be able to refute the theories of heretics by means of these arguments, questions, proofs and explanations.⁹

In the *Uttaradhyayana Sutra* bad monks who do not protect themselves from sin, who though having the appearance of monks are the lowest among their worthy brethren have been likened to heretics. They are despised in this world like poison, they are no bodies in this world or in that beyond.¹⁰ The views and teachings of heretics have been called delusive talk which is untrue and without any meaning.¹¹ Opinions and manifold doctrines not conforming to the *Nirgrantha* creed were declared to be contemptible which a monk was advised to abandon for they were productive of evil everywhere.¹² Faith has been held to be easier to obtain for those who though not versed in the sacred doctrines are not acquainted with other systems and hold no wrong doctrines. Right faith depends on the avoiding of schismatical and heretical tenets.¹³ Among the eight principles on which excellence of faith rests are counted absence of preference for heresies and non-shaking of right belief at the prosperity of heretical acts.¹⁴

In the *Nandi Sutra* Mahavira has been enlogised as the moon who ever vanquishes the Rahu of *Akriya vada*¹⁵ as the destroyer of the lustre of other schools¹⁶ and as the destroyer of the pride of false faiths.

It will be seen from the remarks quoted above that the time was full of various opinions, views, beliefs, schools, sects and teachings.¹⁷ They were not at all friendly towards each other as can be easily gathered. It will now be our task to examine the many references throughout

Ibid vi 174

Uttar S xvii 20

Ibid xviii 28

⁹ Ibid xvi 1, 28, 30

Ibid xviii 28, 29

Ibid xvii 31

¹¹ Nan S 9

Ibid 10 & 22

How differences and disputes arose over subject that would be regarded as beyond the scope of religion in the present day is illustrated in Rhag S 119418 in the story of Prince Siva where cosmographic details form the subject of the disputes and in 1112433 where derivation of the gods' lives in different heavens is hotly debated. Manifold disputes and their uselessness are also referred to by the Buddhists in *Duṣṣhāṭṭhaka*, *Suddhāṭṭhaka*, *Paramaṭṭhaka*, *Paśāra*, *Māgandhya*, *Cīlavijāṭhaka* and *Mahāvijāṭhaka* Suttas of the *Alīhaka* *ṛga*.

the canon with a view to find out what views each of them upheld and whether any of them can be identified with schools whose doctrines we are familiar with. This will serve a double purpose, of showing in the first place what was the historical background of the Nirgrantha doctrine, what views they felt called upon to refute and thereby establish the superiority of the Nirgrantha creed, and secondly of showing though in an indirect manner the condition of many doctrines of the time by means of the light thrown by the Jainas regarding the philosophical and religious atmosphere of India of that period. It is agreed that a hostile critic's remarks cannot be accepted in full in judging the value or contents of a creed it took upon itself to criticise, yet the opinion of an adverse critic seen through a proper perspective has its own value for historical purposes, indicating as it does the currents of popular opinion. It is to be remembered that this work is not intended to be a history of the philosophies of the time. The principal object is to get as clear an idea as is possible of the tenets as they appeared to the Nirgranthas, of other schools and sects in those ancient days with a view to create a suitable background for the study of Jainism.

Many of the statements met with in different places are vague such as the vehement denunciation of those who injure earth bodies, water bodies, plants, wind bodies, animals, etc.¹ for such would apply to many non-Nirgranthas. Jacobi thinks² on the authority of Sīlāṅka the commentator that others only pretend to be houseless; refers to the Buddhists. It must be pointed out however that we know now that there were in those days many kinds of houseless ascetics besides the Buddhists to whom the remarks of the Jainas would equally apply.³ We shall deal however with only those statements which are particular, precise and identifiable and consider them in the order of importance given them in the Jaina texts.

PART I

(I) THE ĀJIVĪYAS

The doctrines of the Ājivīyas are the best known heresy to the Nirgranthas. Judging from the frequency of their appearance and the

AcBr S 1:22 1134 1154 1172 1:84

SRP xx:1 p 4

See also Sat S 1116 1118 and the long disputes between Nirgranthas and other in Bh 8 877 132593 696 18763 634 and 188640 Sh S 3:2167

Asp S 38

vehemence and care with which they are denounced it seems probable that the doctrines of the Ājivīyas played an important part in the life of the times

The Ājivīyas believed that though it is proved that there are individual souls they experience pleasure and pain and on dying lose their state of existence yet misery and pleasure are not caused by the souls themselves, for how could it be caused they asked by other agents as time etc? Pleasure and misery final beatitude and temporal pleasure and pain are not caused by the souls themselves nor by others but the individual souls experience them it is the fate assigned them by Destiny ¹¹

Another account states that there is no such thing as exertion or labour or power or vigour or manly strength but that all things are caused by destiny which is unalterably fixed ¹² This has been called the doctrine of Gosala Maṅkhalaputta From the story of Saddalaputta the potter of Palasapura and an adherent of the Ājivīyas we get the leading doctrine of Gosala The story runs thus

Saddalaputta once brought out his potter's ware from within his workshop and placed them in the sun Mahavira happened to come upon the scene and asked Saddalaputta how is this potter's ware made?

Saddalaputta 'Reverend Sir this ware is at first clay then it is kneaded with water and then it is mixed well together with ashes and dung then it is placed on the wheel and finally many bowls and jars of various sizes are made

Mahavira 'Saddalaputta is your ware made by dint of exertion and manly strength or on the other hand is it made without exertion and manly strength—*kim uṭṭhanenam ca lābhammenam ca balenam ca viriṇenam ca purisaḥkaraṇaḥkaramenam kaṇṇanti udaku anuṭṭhanenam jata apuri saḥkaraḥkaramenam kaṇṇanti?*

Saddalaputta 'Reverend Sir it is made without exertion and manly strength and all things are unalterably fixed'

Mahavira Saddalaputta, if any one of thy men were to steal thy unbaked or baked ware or scatter it about or make holes in it or let it drop into pieces or place it outside unguarded or if he were to indulge in outrageous familiarities with thy wife Aggumittā what punishment would thou inflict on that man?

Saddalaputta Reverend Sir, that man I will curse or beat or tie up or frighten or threaten or cuff or fine or bully or even before his time deprive him of his life

Mahāvira then pointed out that if all things were unalterably fixed and depended not on exertion then he ought not to take any action against his servant's conduct for the servant was not responsible for it. This convinced Saddalaputta of the falseness of Ājīvika doctrines and he was converted to the creed of Mahāvira.²³

The Parable of the Lotus pool is an important chapter in which the views of some of the leading schools have been stated

There was a lotus-pool containing much water and mud full of white lotuses delightful and magnificent. In the very middle of this lotus-pool grew one big white lotus. Now there came from each of the four quarters a man proud of his own abilities and attempted to fetch the big white lotus. To each of them as he proceeded the water and mud seemed to extend so that he could neither reach the white lotus nor return to the bank and was stuck in the mud. Then came a restrained monk who called aloud standing on the bank and the big white lotus flew to him. Mahāvira narrated this story and asked his disciples if they understood the meaning of the simile and on their answering in the negative explained that the lotus pool meant the world the water meant *karman* the mud meant pleasures the lotuses meant people in general the big white lotus meant the king the four men meant the heretics the monk meant the Law the bank meant the Order and the monk's voice meant the preaching of the Law and the big lotus flying up meant *nirvana*. Different teachers went to the king to teach him but only the Nirgrantha ascetic succeeded.

One of these four teachers an Ājīvika states his doctrines as follows

There are two kinds of men one admits and another does not admit action. Both are alike their case is the same because they are actuated by the same force. An ignorant man thinks of the case as follows

When I suffer grieve blame myself grow feeble am afflicted or undergo punishment I have caused it or when another man suffers etc. he has caused it. Thus an ignorant man thinks himself or another to be the cause of what he or the other man experiences. A wise man thinks about the cause as follows. When I suffer I did not cause it or when another

man suffers he did not cause it. By the will of fate all beings are born and made to suffer changes of life or to die."²⁴

Adda's discussions with various teachers while renouncing the life of a Prince he was on his way to Mahāvira are interesting. In these discussions one man states that if an ascetic living alone uses cold water, eats seeds, accepts things prepared for him or has intercourse with women he commits no sins thereby.²⁵ Harṣakula, author of the *Dīpikā* on the *Sūtrāṅga* and *Silanka* identify this man as Gosala which is corroborated by the fierce personal attacks he makes on Mahāvira in course of the discussions. This is natural enough for the relations between the two were notoriously bitter. The fact however appears to be that the Ājīvika doctrines have been put forward through this fictitious person.

The soul of him who is pure will become free from bad *karman* on reaching beatitude, but in that state it will again become defiled through pleasant excitement or hate and that he who has lived on earth as a restrained monk will become free from *karman* and as clear water which was free from defilement again becomes defiled so will be the soul. This doctrine has been attributed to a school. Harṣakula thinks that the Ājīvikas are meant. Silanka mentions the *Traitāṅikas* besides Ājīvikas. The *Traitāṅikas* are the Jainā followers of the *Vaiśeṣika* philosophy. They are so called because they believed in a third state of existence besides *jīva* and *ajīva*.²⁷

In some places the Ājīvikas are mentioned by name but hardly anything is mentioned regarding their views.²⁸ Once we find them asking the Nirgrantha elders the question whether an article belonging to a young monk belongs to himself or to another, if it is stolen by a thief when the young ascetic is observing the *śamāyikas* and the monk goes after the thief.²⁹ They are said not to accept Mahāvira's doctrine of abstention from sin of body, mind and speech in the three fold divisions of doing it oneself, getting it done by another or approving of another's doing it.³⁰

On the life of Gosala we have the following details supplied by the Jainas. His father was called Manbhāh who used to wander about from

²⁴ Sūtr. II 1.30-33

²⁵ Ibid. II vi. 7

²⁶ SBP. xlv p. 245 n. 2.

²⁷ See *infra* the 7th schism led by Rishabadeva

²⁸ Bhag. 1.2.24

²⁹ Bhag. 8.6.328

³⁰ Bhag. 8.6.329

carimaini) The first four of the eight Finalities were the last four acts performed by Gosala, *i.e.* the last drink the last song the last dance and the last improper solicitation. The other four were the last tornado the last sprinkling elephant the last fight with big stones and missiles¹¹ and the last Tirthankara who is Gosala himself.

Gosala's sprinkling himself with the muddy water from the earthen vessels gave rise to the doctrine of the four things that may be used as drinks and the four things as their substitutes by virtue of the coolingness. Those that may be used as water are the cow's urine water accidentally collected in potter's vessels water heated by the sun and water dripping from a rock. Those that may be used as substitutes are holding in the hand a dish or a bottle or a jar or a pot which is cool or moist squeezing in the mouth a mango or a hog plum or a jujube or a *tindula* fruit when it is unripe or uncooked but not drinking its juice squeezing in the mouth *kalaya* or *mugga* or *masa* or *simbali* beans when they are unripe or uncooked but not drinking the juice and feeling the touch of the moist hands of the gods Purnabhadda and Manabhadda when they appear on the last night of six months to one who eats pure food for six months lies successively for two months each on bare ground on wooden planks and on *darba* grass. He who submits to the touch of the two gods furthers the work of venomous snakes but he who does not do so generates in himself a fire which burns his body and he dies and attains liberation.

Ayambula an Ajivika came to visit Gosala at the time and felt ashamed finding Gosala in a delirium. He was about to go away but Ajivika elders called him back explained the new doctrines and asked him to put his question to Gosala after throwing away the mango in his hand. Ayambula did so and asked about the *halla* insect. Gosala replied This which you see is not a mango but only the skin of a mango. You ask about the *halla* insect—it is like the root of the bamboo play the lute man play the lute. The Gosala feeling the end approaching called his disciples and requested them to observe his funeral with all honours and proclaim that he was the last Tirthankara. But afterwards he felt that he was not an omniscient but a false teacher and a humbug but that Mahavira was the true Jina. Then he called his disciples and asked them to treat

¹¹ The first three of the latter four refer to historical events of the time. The sprinkling elephant was known as *Sevanaka* and belonged to king Srenika of Magadha who gave it to his younger son by queen Cellana. His elder son Kunika then gave rise to war in which stone missiles were used.

him with dishonour after he was dead and proclaim his misdeeds and the Junahood of Mahavira. Then he died. The Ājivya *theras* closed the door and pretended to carry out Gosala's last instructions and then they opened the doors and gave him a funeral according to his original wishes.²²

The austerities practised by the Ājivyas are classified into four kinds: 1. severe austerities, 2. fierce austerities, 3. abstention from ghee and other delicacies, and 4. indifference to pleasant and unpleasant food.²³

It is said in the system of the Ājivyas that all the living beings are subject to an ungratified desire to enjoy and hence their earning of livelihood is by killing, cutting, etc.²⁴

The varieties of the Ājivya ascetics are these—those who beg in every second house, those who beg in every third house, those who beg in every fourth house, those who beg in every fifth house, those who beg in every sixth house, those who beg in every seventh house, those who accept lotus-stalks only as alms under certain conditions, those who beg in every house, those who do not beg if there is a flash of lightning, and those who practise penances by entering big earthen vessels.²⁵

The names of the twelve adherents of the Ājivya doctrine are given as Tala, Talapilamba, Uvviha, Samviha, Udaya, Avaviha, Namudaya, Namudaya, Anulalaya, Samkhalaya, Avambula, and Kayaraya. They abstained from eating five kinds of fruit: 1. umbra, 2. ada, 3. bora, 4. salara, and 5. pilankhu, and are said to have given up eating roots, bulbous roots, etc.²⁶

The Samānaphala Sutta of the Buddhists, which contains an account of the doctrines of the six principal teachers contemporary with Buddha, gives an account of Gosala's teachings from where we get the same denial of the usefulness of effort or manly vigour. '*Natthi atthakare natthi parakare natthi purisakare natthi balam natthi viriyam natthi puti sathamam natthi putisaparakkhamam*—the attainment of anything does not depend either on one's own acts or on the acts of another or on human effort; there is no such thing as power or energy or human strength or human vigour'—*Digha nikāya*, Vol. II, p. 53. Every thing depends on fate and salvation depends on a long series of births of different kind.

Bhag. 15.538-554

Sth. 4.2.310

Bhag. 8.5.930

Asp. p. 41. For Buddhist evidence of Mahavagga 3.129 for the last of these classes, and the *Upasādhana Sutta* for ascetic practices resembling these. Bh. 11. 8.6.430

No change can be effected in this long series of transmigrations but by man's effort on the part of an individual with all his faculties to good. Dr. D. B. B. has reviewed in an exhaustive manner all the matter available on the life and teachings of Gosala. We do not intend to go here into any detailed examination of Gosala's teachings for which we must be referred to Dr. B. B. B.'s work. The conclusions reached by him hold up Gosala and his teachings in a far better light of our times. But the fact remains that his teachings were atabornly opposed by Mahavira and Buddha alike. It is essential to remember that Mahavira's opposition was due to Gosala's main doctrine of man's destiny being preordained; that human effort could effect no change in it; and that liberation was to be obtained only after a long series of transmigrations. These views notwithstanding the fact that the Jain and Buddhist accounts of Gosala's teachings are not in agreement. Dr. B. B. B. is of opinion that contrary to the Jain account Mahavira was a disciple of Gosala for sometime. The reasons put forward in support of this hypothesis are that Mahavira was a merchant in the first twelve years of his life, and that he became a monk in the second year of his manhood, that Gosala predeceased Mahavira by five years and was therefore his senior, and that Gosala was recognized as a teacher at least in brief time before Mahavira's departure. These arguments may be urged; certain considerations in Gosala's life and teachings may be urged before Mahavira does not preclude anything. Accepting the Jain version Gosala was not recognized as a teacher so long as he was associated with Mahavira and proclaimed himself as such only after his separation from the latter. Such proclamation may have taken place before Mahavira's recognition as a teacher. If Gosala had never been Mahavira's teacher we would have expected the Buddhists to record something to this effect. We would have expected also that Gosala would have made it very something regarding his claim when he visited Mahavira's disciples and for the latter calling Gosala a disciple. Further, if Mahavira had renounced the discipleship of Gosala, although the Buddha's account of the relationship existing between the two is not clear, it cannot be accepted in full (at least) and can be accepted as true. The truth joined and lived together for

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There is an interesting account of a Brahman priest named Mahessara datta who was learned in the Vedas etc and who in order to enhance the realm and power of his patron King Jiyasattu caused everyday a Brahman boy a Kshatriya boy a Vaisya boy and a Sudra boy to be seized and their hearts extracted alive with which he performed *homa* sacrifices to propitiate the gods on behalf of the King. On the eighth and fourteenth lunar days he sacrificed two boys from each of the four castes in the fourth month four boys from each caste in the sixth month eight boys and after a year sixteen boys from each caste. Whenever the king was attacked by an enemy, the priest caused eight hundred boys from each caste to be seized and performed *homa* sacrifices with their hearts extracted alive⁸⁰. Although this story is too monstrous to deserve credence it is curious how the underlying idea of offering human sacrifice on the eve of important undertakings hinted in the older Brahmanic literature still lingered in the popular mind⁸¹.

In all the narrative passages in the canonical literature of the Jains the constantly recurring formula about people performing domestic sacrifices expiatory ceremonies etc—*ahayakayavalikamma kayalouja manglapayachhitta*—is used to describe the daily life of people who are not yet converted by Mahavira to the Nirgrantha doctrine or in respect of whom the question of conversion does not arise. All these persons from princes to peasants belonged apparently to the Brahmanical fold in the absence of any reference pointing to their adherence to any other creed.

Making a slight departure from the order we are following in our treatment of these various philosophical systems we shall take up at this stage some views which are associated with the Brahmanical fold.

SAMKHYA AND YOGA

The world was created according to some by Īśāna according to others this world with living beings and lifeless things with its variety of pleasure and pain was produced from *prakāśa* (*pradhāna*)⁸². The first of these two views is to be ascribed to the adherents of a theistic school and the second to the Sāmkhya system or we may take them to refer to the theistic and atheistic followers of the Sāmkhya philosophy⁸³.

⁸⁰ Vip. S. 1.5

Cf. Sat. Pr. VI. 1.15 VII. 1.18

⁸¹ Sat. S. I.136

⁸² See Jacobi SBE. xiv p. 246 n. 4

PURANISTS

Another philosopher says⁴⁰ that the world is limited but eternal. This view is ascribed by Harṣakula and Śilāṅka to Vyāsa for Vyāsa says that the world consists of seven islands.

THE UPANISADS

The view is said to be held by some fools that as the earth though it is but one pile presents many forms so the intelligent principle viz the *ātman* appears under various forms as the universe⁴¹. That the world is created is said to be an error committed by some philosophers⁴².

The universe again is said by some Brahmapas and Śramanas to have been produced from the primeval egg and that He (Brahma) created the things⁴³. Some say⁴⁴ that the knowledge of the highest authority is unlimited. Harṣakula and Śilāṅka argue that that which has no limit in time and space is called unlimited by some teachers but those who possess a knowledge of this unlimited by means of super-sensual vision do not thereby necessarily become omniscient. The meaning appears to be that the Vedantins' idea of the Absolute is that it transcends knowledge and that one who knows the Absolute becomes as it were the Absolute himself both the ideas being very frequent in the Upaniṣads. The Jainas however contend that those who possess a knowledge of the Absolute as a transcendental Being do not thereby themselves become entitled to be called omniscient. The text goes on to say that the same philosopher holds that the knowledge is limited in every way. Harṣakula and Śilāṅka regard these two apparently contradictory views to belong to the same philosophers and solve the difficulty by taking the latter view to allude to Brahma asleep for a thousand years alternating with his wakefulness for another thousand years during which he is unconscious and conscious respectively and so the knowledge is both limited and unlimited. The context of the verse is that the Nirgrantha ascetics should know the ordinary views of the common people for some of them say things which are the outcome of a wrong understanding and as an illustration mentions apparently contradictory views held by Vedantins and Puranists.

Sat S I: 46

Sat S I: 119

Sat S I: 139 Cf. Kaṣha Up II v 9-10

Sat S I: 138

Sat S I: 47

existent does not come into existence and all things are eternal by their very nature" This is known as the Doctrine of the soul as the sixth substance. Harṣakula includes the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika among its adherents and Śīlanka includes the Sāṃkhya and Sārvadhārikas who accept the authority of the Vedas¹⁹ Śīlanka quotes many verses of the *Bhagavadgita* to illustrate the philosophy of the indestructibility of the soul and the non-coming into existence of the non-existent. If the non-existent came into existence, remarks Śīlanka, it would make the growth of a horn possible to an ass. This doctrine of the eternal existence of the soul and the five elements—earth, water, fire, air, and sky—is a criticism of the Buddhist view that things are changing every moment without any cause and of the Vaiśeṣika view that things are destructible just as a pitcher is destroyed if struck with a staff. The reply of this school is that a thing is not destroyed either with or without a cause. A pitcher smashed with a staff exists, lives, and continues in the broken pieces for out of that lump came its existence.

We have to compare in this connection the doctrine of Pakudha Kaccayana stated in the Samannaphala Sutta (Digha II p. 56). Pakudha held that seven things—earth, water, fire, air, ease, pain, and the soul—are neither made nor commanded to be made, are not created and are of a permanent existence. There is nothing called slayer or the slain. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain, no one thereby deprives another of life; a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary substances.

(IV) TAJJINĀTICCHAKKIRA VADĀ

The five gross elements are the original causes of things and from them arises another thing—the soul. This is another philosophy well known to the Jains. The soul is a product of the elements and has no independent existence of its own. On the dissolution of the body of five elements a living being ceases to exist and nothing is left over²¹. Everybody, fool or sage, has an individual *jīva* soul. These souls exist as long as the body but after death they are no more; there are no souls which are born again. There is neither virtue nor vice; there is no world beyond; and on the dissolution of the body the individual ceases to be²².

Sut.S I i 115-16

In the Sāṃkhya system there are other elements besides these five.

Sut.S I i 18. Jacobs has linked this verse with the following one. This is not justified for the latter refers to Vedānta.

Sut.S I i 11-12

The Parable of the Lotus pool explains the theory thus⁷³ Upwards from the soles of the feet downwards from the tips of the hair on the head within the skin's surface is what is called *jiva* or what is the same *ātman*. The whole soul lives, when the body is dead it does not live. It lasts as long as the body lasts, it does not outlast the destruction of the body. With the body ends life. Other men carry the corpse away to burn it. When it has been consumed by fire only dove coloured bones remain and the four bearers return to the village with the bier. Therefore there is and exists no soul different from the body. Those who say that the body is distinct from the soul cannot tell whether the soul is long or small globular or circular triangular or square hexagonal or octagonal black or blue red or yellow or white sweet or bitter hard or soft, heavy or light cold or hot. As a man draws a sword from the scabbard and shows the sword and the scabbard separately as he draws a fibre from the *mūnja* grass and shows the stalk and the fibre separately or as he can take bone and flesh butter and milk oil and oil-cake juice and sugarcane and fire and *arati* wood and show them separately so no one can show the soul and the body separately and therefore no soul exists. Life ends here as it naturally follows and there is nothing beyond.

The discussion between king Payasi and Kesi a young ascetic lucidly explains the logic on which this philosophy was based⁷⁴. The discussion as compressed is as follows.

Payasi: 'Sir is it your doctrine that the soul and body are two different things and not the same thing?

Kesi: O Payasi it is the doctrine with us the Nirgrantha ascetics that the soul and the body are two separate things and that they are not the same thing.'

Payasi: If Sir that is your doctrine then why does not my grand father who was a tyrannical ruler and must have been reborn in the hells for many of the sins committed by him come and warn me his favourite grandchild against committing such sins? If he did then I would believe that his soul is still alive and that the soul and the body are separate things.

Kesi replied at length to the effect that if a person offended against his queen and if when Payasi seized the offender in order to punish him

⁷³ Edt S. II i 15-17 19
Raj. 65-71

the latter wanted to be allowed to come away so that he might warn his relations against committing such acts lest they also be punished as he was then would Payesi allow him to come away? Similar was the case with those suffering torments in hell they could not come away howsoever they might long for it

Payesi I had a grandmother who was a very pious lady and must have been born in the heavens after death. If she would come and exhort me to righteousness then I would believe that the soul and the body are different things

Kesi answered at length pointing out that as Payesi would not respond to another's call to come away while Payesi was entering a temple properly sanctified through fear lest he be defiled so also his grandmother too would not come

Payesi Once while I was seated in my outer hall of audience surrounded by many chiefs my Prefect of the Police brought a thief in chains whom I ordered to be put alive in an iron vessel which was hermetically sealed and guards were placed around it. Then after some days I went to the iron vessel caused it to be unsealed and myself looked for the soul of that thief. If there were holes in the vessel I would have believed that the soul had escaped but as there were none therefore no soul exists apart from the body

Kesi answered that just as if a man took a trumpet inside a house closed every opening carefully, and then sounded the trumpet it would be heard outside although there was no apparent outlet so the soul also could penetrate through earth stone etc

Payesi Once I cut into pieces a thief and put the body inside a closely guarded hermetically sealed iron vessel. Opening it after some time I found countless number of worms. Because these living worms originated out of the dead body—for there was no opening for them to enter—my doctrine is sound that the soul and the body are not different things

Kesi replied that the king must have had occasion sometime or other to watch the heating of iron and he must have then seen how it became red hot. There were no opening in the iron through which the fire could have entered and in the same manner the soul of the dead man had gone out and the souls of the worms had entered the iron vessel unperceived by the senses

of nothing but these five elements. They are the primary cause of the world even down to a blade of the grass. A man buys or causes to buy kills or causes to kill cooks and causes to cook he may even sell and kill a man—and even then he does not do any wrong¹⁷

In the Samāññaphala Sutta of the Buddhists the doctrines said to belong to Ajita Kesakambali are an echo of Nāstika vāda. Ajita taught that there is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next. After death the elements constituting the body return to the elements. On the dissolution of the body everyone is cut off annihilated and after death there is nothing¹⁸

This doctrine is also called Lokayata vāda. Tājjivastacchariṇa vāda held practically the same view with Nāstika vāda only with this difference that while the latter deny altogether the existence of the soul the former admit it but the logical end of both the views would be exactly the same.

(VI) BUDDHISM

A heretic says in connection with the use of water for various purposes that it is justified on the ground of his having permission to drink it or take it for toilet purposes¹⁹. Śīlapka takes the e heretics to be Buddhists. This can be accepted without objection for we know that Buddha declared that no sin was committed by drinking water and he permitted bath and washing to his ascetic disciples²⁰

The Nirgranthas looked upon the Ājiviyas as their worst opponents but if facts are considered they suffered most at the hands of the Buddhists in later times. Buddha was a junior contemporary of Mahāvira and had therefore greater need and occasion for counteracting and criticising the creed of the latter than Mahāvira had of fighting with the doctrines of a junior. The rivalry of the two sects grew stronger after Mahāvira's death. These facts account to some extent for the comparatively scantier mention and criticism of Buddhistic doctrines in the literature of the Jains than what would normally be expected of the two chief sects of the time.

Sat S. II 12128

¹⁷ Barua. A History of Pre-Buddhist Indian Philosophy p. 293 points out that Ajita's views were not materialistic in the gross sense in which they were understood by Mahāvira and Buddha but what he really meant was a protest against the view that soul and body were entirely separated.

Acār S. I 137

C/ Mahāvagga 12512 5137

With regard to the suffering of cold by renouncing clothes and fire some heretical monks are reported to say that they would put on more clothes and by kindling a fire they would be able to bear the very painful influence of the cold²¹ This may be regarded as applying to the Buddhists for they were certainly not indifferent to unnecessary suffering. We cannot of course be absolutely certain for Brahmanical ascetics would also light a fire and take clothings for protection from cold.

The doctrine of five *skandhas* of momentary existence has been ascribed to some fools. They are said not to admit that the soul is different from nor identical with the elements that it is produced from a cause (the elements) nor that it is without a cause i.e. that it is eternal²² This is a clear reference to the Buddhists with their *rūpa redana viññāna samyā* and *samskāra skandhas*. The existence of a soul in the popular sense of the term apart from the five *skandhas* was denied by Buddha.

Earth, water, fire and air these four *dhatus* are said to combine to form the body according to the *Janakas* (*gnanins*)²³ Harṣakula explains *Janakas* as *pañcāśramanya Bauddhah*. A variant in the text reads *javare* (*ca+apare*) for *Janaya* and this also has been explained as referring to the Buddhists. Jacobi thinks²⁴ that the word, *Janaya* may be derived from *jana* vehicle which the Buddhists used to designate the two sections of the church i.e. the *Himavāna* and the *Mahayāna*. Against this may be pointed out that the Buddhists used the word in respect of themselves only after the great schism arose among them whereas the present statement appears to be older in age. However all opinion is agreed in understanding this passage to be a reference to the Buddhists.

The *Akriyavādins* who deny *karman* and do not admit that the action of the soul is transmitted to the future moments²⁵ are understood by Śīlaṅka to refer to the Buddhists. The doctrine that everything has but a momentary existence and that there is no continuous identity of existence between a thing as it is now and as it will be in the next moment is one of the Buddhist theories. The Buddhists are included among *Akriyavādins* by the *Nirgranthas* because by not admitting the existence of *jīva* they were considered to deny *karman* as well. Jacobi takes this to refer

Acār S I vii 2.14
 Sūtr. 6 I ii 17
 S i S I ii 18
 SBE xi p. 238 n. 4
 Sat S I xi 4

to Samkhya because according to it the *puruṣa* does not act " We shall have to treat of Akriyavada at greater length later on but in connection with the present verse it has to be pointed out that although this verse and the one following have been commented upon by Śīlaṅka at great length as applying to the Buddhists yet we must widen the limits of Akriyavada beyond Buddhist doctrines

In the discussions of Adda one man appears and says" that if one pierces a lump of oil cake with a spit mistaking it for a man or a gourd mistaking it for a baby and roasts it one will be guilty of murder according to his views If a savage puts a man on a spit and roasts him mistaking him for a lump of oil-cake or a baby mistaking it for a gourd he will not be guilty of murder If anybody thrusts a spit through a man or a baby mistaking him or it for a lump of oil-cake puts him or it on the fire and roasts that will be a meal fit for the Buddhas to break fast upon " Those who always feed two thousand worthy monks says this man to Adda acquire great merit and become powerful gods in Arupadhatu Thus is an account although exaggerated of the Buddhist view that motive determines whether an act is sinful or not If the state of mind was murderous it was a sin even though the act committed in execution of this intention did not actually result in the loss of life again no sin is committed by the accidental killing of life when the act intended was not murder It has to be taken as an echo of Buddha's statement that the state of mind accompanying an act was more important than the actual result of the act * The Arupadhatu is the highest heaven of the Buddhists The combination of all this is sufficient to establish its reference to the Buddhists

Another verse credits some with holding that salvation which was a pleasant thing was produced by enjoying pleasures " Harṣakula and Śīlaṅka take it to refer to the Buddhists and quote many passages in support of their identification

sarvaṇi sattvaṇi sukhe ratam sarvāni duḥkhaḥ ca samudvijanti |

tasmāt sukhārthi sukham eva dadyat sukhapradata labhate sukham ||

SBT xiv p 316 n 3

Sat S II 6 26-29

Buddhāna iama kappali pī anāya Harṣakula explains buddhānam as bhikkhūnam while Śīlaṅka says Buddhānam aṇi bhogaṇāya yo-yam bhavati which shows he took it to mean for the Buddhas Puddha was used by Jains and Buddhists alike to denote their master and in itself is not sufficient to indicate its applicability to the latter

Cf Buddha's conversation with Digha Tapassi a Vṛgrantha ascetic and with Upāl a lay disciple of Mahāvīra and Upāl's conversion in Upālī Sutta

Sat S I iii 4 6

(VII) MINOR SCHOOLS

A school of philosophers thought that a *jīva* performed *sammatta kīriyam* (*sanjyaktakīriyā*) right conduct and *micchattakīriyam* (*miṭhyat-kīriya*) wrong conduct at the same time i.e. while it performed right conduct at the same time it performed wrong conduct also and while it performed wrong conduct it performed also right conduct at the same time." Valayaguri the commentator says that it is the doctrine of Caraka. Gunaratna says that Caraka represented a school of Sāṃkhya."

Another view held by some was to the effect that there was no harm in enjoying the pleasures of the senses for it gave relief to the enjoyer without causing harm to any one else just as the squeezing of a blister or boil gave relief and has no dangerous consequences. A ram drinks the quiet water which gives it relief. If this harmed the ram we could have said that the act was harmful but as it did not there is surely no harm in it." In the identification of the upholder of this view Harṣakula has the same doubts which he had with regard to Satavadins mentioned above.

According to another school it is not only the soul which does not exist but nothing exists. Everything is mere appearance a mirage an illusion a dream or phantasy. There rises no sun nor does it set there waxes no moon nor does it wane there are no rivers running nor any wind blowing the whole world is unreal." The Madhyamika school of the Buddhists and the popular Mayavada which arose as an offshoot of Vedānta owe their origin probably to this school which is met here in the literature of the Jains for the first time in the history of Indian philosophical thought.

In Savatthi there were two rival schools who disputed the point whether knowledge was superior to conduct or conduct was superior to knowledge." Abhayadeva the commentator quotes some of their views e.g.

kriyāya phalada pūṇam na jñānam phaladam matam |
yataḥ strībhakṣyabhogajño na jñānat sukhito bhavet ||

Conduct always bears fruit not so knowledge—just as one having merely the knowledge of enjoyment of women does not thereby become happy

Jivā S 3 104

* *Tarkarahasyadīptikā* a commentary on *Śaddarśanasamuccaya* p 31

Sd S I: 4 10-12

" Slt S I xii 7

" Bhag III S 10 354

jaha kharo candanabharavahu bharassa bhagi na hu candanassa I
 evam khu nami carapena hino napassa bhagi na hu sogae II

As ass carrying a load of sandal wood carries only a load but does not enjoy the sandal wood so the man possessing knowledge but devoid of conduct enjoys his knowledge but does not obtain progress

The supporters of knowledge on the other hand said

vijnaptih phalada pumsam na kriva phalada matā I
 mūthyajnanat pravṛttasya phal'asamvadadarśanat II

It is knowledge which bears fruit not so conduct for wrong knowledge does not produce the desired result

paḍhamam naṇam tao daya evam ciṭṭhai savva.amjae I
 annapi kim kahi va nahi chejapavayam II

First comes knowledge then charity—thus are constituted all those who are restrained one lacking in knowledge knows not what to do or what to know and whether one is wise or a sinner

PART II

CLASSIFICATION INTO FOUR GREAT SCHOOLS

The account of philosophical schools mentioned in the Jaina canonical literature has been dealt with exhaustively above but the most important part of the work yet remains unfinished i.e. their classification according to a method well known in this literature

The heretical creeds of the time were all comprehended by Mahavira under four heads¹⁰⁰ i.e.

- 1 Kriyavada
- 2 Akriyavada
- 3 Ajñānavada
- 4 Vinayavada


These four great schools comprise three hundred and sixty three schools¹. Kriyavada consists of one hundred and eighty schools Akriyavada consists of eighty four schools Ajñānavada consists of sixty seven schools and Vinayavada consists of thirty two schools¹.

The scheme of classification in details is as follows

1 Kriyavada

Kriya denotes the existence of jiva etc. and those who admit the existence of jiva etc. are called Kriyāvādins

The Jains have the nine principles of jiva soul *ajiva* non soul *asrava* the inflow of karmic matter into the soul *bandha* the consequent bondage of the soul *samvara* stoppage of the inflow *nirjara* shedding off the karmic matter *punya* merit *apunya* demerit and *moksha* emancipation. Let us take the first jiva and draw a table as below



¹⁰⁰ Sd̐ S I 111 Sth S 44345 Bhag S 301874 Utt S 1323 Nandī 47 and Sd̐ S II 1179

Sd̐ S II 1179

Nandī 47 Guṇaratna quotes the following couplet—

Asus yam kury nam akriyavādina ho culasī
Annāṃ sattaṃ venaṃjānam ca battisam II

Those who admit the existence of the soul (*jīva*) by itself (*rātaḥ*) for all eternity (*astya*) through Time (*kāla*) are the first school. They say that the soul exists in its own nature, it is eternal and acts through Time. They are called *Kālatāḍins*. Guṇaratna quotes the following as stating their doctrine:

na kalavyatirekena garbhabalāsubhālikam |
yat kiñci jīvate loka tadasau karaṇam kālaḥ ||
kim ca kalid gte naita mudgapaktirapiśyate |
sthalādisannidhāne pi tataḥ kālād au mataḥ ||
kalabbhāve ca garbhādī carvaṇam svād avyavasthayaḥ |
pareṣṭahetusaḍbhāsamātrād eva tad dbhavaḥ ||
kālaḥ pacatī bhūtaṇi kālaḥ saṃharate prajāḥ |
kālaḥ supteṣu jagurīti kālo hi duratīkramaḥ ||

The blossoming of trees and plants, the appearance of fruits, the change of seasons, the movement of stars and planets, the periods of gestation, infancy, adolescence, youth, old age, etc. could not have taken place if there were no Time. In the absence of Time everything would be in disorder, but such disorder we neither find nor desire. Cooking, for instance, depends not on the bringing together of fire, pan and other materials, but on Time. It is not at the sweet will of man that causes happen, but according to the order of Time and we cannot dispense with it.

Those who say that the soul exists in itself eternally through *īśvara* (God) are the second school called *Īśaratāḍins*. They regard the universe as made by God who is endowed with the attributes of perfection and is the ordainer of heaven or hell for men.

Those who say that the soul exists by itself eternally through *ātman* (Self) are the third school called *Ātmatāḍins*. According to them the Self creates everything.

Those who say that the soul exists in itself eternally through *niyati* (the fixed order of thing) are the fourth school called *Niyatāḍins*. According to them there is a principle called *niyati* by which all that exist assume their form in a prescribed manner and not otherwise. Whatever comes out of something at one time always comes out of that thing in a regular manner, as otherwise the law of cause and effect and the law of uniformity of nature would not be in operation, for there would be nothing to determine the order of events (*anyatha karyakāraṇajavasthā pratinīyalarūpavyavasthā ca na bhavet nīyāmakabhāḥīḥ*).

Those who say that the soul exists by itself eternally through *śabha* (Nature) are the fifth school called *Śvabhāvādins*. They hold that everything is caused by Nature e.g. the clay becomes a jar and not a piece of cloth, a piece of cloth comes from yarn while a jar does not do so. The uniform production of jars from clay shows the order of Nature. Guṇaratna quotes the following as illustrating the doctrine of *Śvabhāvādins*:

labh kṛtākanam prakaroṭi tatkṣṇyam |
 vicitrabhaṇam mṛgapakṣīnam ca ||
 śvabhāvataḥ sarvaṇidam pravṛttam |
 na karmacaro stī kutaḥ prayatnaḥ ||
 badaryah kṛtakaḥ tīkṣṇaḥ tjur ekaśca kuncitah |
 phalam ca vartulam tasya vada kena vinirmitam ||

What causes thorns to have sharp points and birds and beasts to have their own wonderful ways? All this is ordained by Nature and there is no caprice anywhere. Of the jujube tree the thorns are sharp-pointed some straight some bent the fruit is round—by whom are all these made?

Even the simple phenomenon of the cooking of the mudga also depends on Nature. The *kankaduka mudga* for instance cannot be cooked even after the combination of a pan fuel and Time for by nature it is a kind of cereal that is not softened by boiling. Therefore that in the presence of which effects follow and in the absence of which effects do not follow is to be regarded as the cause.

We have thus obtained five schools under *astī jīvaḥ s-ataḥ nityaḥ*. Under *astī jīvaḥ s-ataḥ anityaḥ* we shall have another five schools accordingly as the non-eternity is predicated of *kala* etc. Then under the head *astī jīvaḥ parataḥ nityaḥ* we shall have another five schools according as not of itself is predicated of *kala* etc. The five classes of *kala* etc. are to be supplied under both *nitya* and *anitya* varieties of *s-ataḥ* and *parataḥ*. The *parataḥ* schools mean that the existence of *jīva* is admitted not of itself but as it is distinguished from other objects for it is well known how things are known by contrast with other things just as shortness is known as that which is not long and in the same way the soul is known by distinguishing it from such objects as pillars etc. The *nitya* varieties of *parataḥ* would give us yet another set of five schools. So we have twenty schools on *jīva* the first of the nine principles and by extending the same classification to each of the eight other principles we have altogether

nine times twenty or one hundred and eighty schools comprised in *Kriyavada*


To *kriyavadins* have been ascribed the views that unless a sinful thought is translated into action or a sinful act performed with a sinful motive the full karmic consequences will not follow and such acts will affect the soul but slightly¹⁰⁰ and that misery is produced by one's own works and not by the work of somebody else i.e. fate creator etc.¹⁰¹

The meaning is that the state of mind and conduct must combine to constitute sin for any one of them without the other would not give rise to the consequences of a sinful *karman*. Silanka points out that they hold that action alone leads to liberation even though it be unaccompanied by right knowledge and right faith

2 Akriyavada

The *Akriyavadins* deny the existence of the soul etc. for according to them everything is of a momentary existence and a state comes to an end the moment it comes into existence and therefore it cannot have any *kriya*. Without continuity of existence no *kriya* is possible the existence itself is the cause and effect of it

The *Akriya adins* are of eighty four varieties obtained in the manner shown below. Let us take seven of the nine principles leaving out *punya* and *apunya*. Of these seven let us take the first *śīla* and draw a table thus



The divisions of *nitya* and *anitya* as in the *Kriyavada* table are not necessary here as the question of eternity and non eternity does not arise when the existence itself of soul etc. is denied. *Yadeccha* is put last because all *Akriyavadins* are *Yadecchavadins*. The same six divisions from *kāla* to *yadeccha* are also to be considered under *paratah* as under *avatah*.

Those who say that no soul exists in itself through Time are the first school. According to them the existence of objects is established from their signs or effects and there are no such signs or effects from which the

¹⁰⁰ Sut S I 2 25 28
¹⁰¹ Set S I 20 11

existence of the soul can be established. The same argument is applied in denying the existence of the soul through *śāra atman vṛyati* and *svabhāva* as in regard to *kala*. *Yadyeccha* means obtainment of results without any determining cause. The *Yadyecchavādins* see no uniformity of causal relation in the world. *śaluka* the root of a particular kind of water lily comes of a *śaluka* as well as of cowdung. fire comes of fire as well as of *arant* a piece of wood. smoke comes of smoke as well as of a combination of fire and fuel. *kandali* 'a particular kind of plant with white flowers appearing very plentifully in the rainy season' comes of *kanda* bulbous root as well as of seeds. the *kaśa* tree comes of seeds as well as of a section of a branch and wheat comes of wheat seeds as well as of bamboo-seeds. So there is plurality and not uniformity in causal relations and everything comes into existence accidentally (*yadyecchatah*) as in a freak. Gunaratna quotes the following as illustrating the views of *Akriyavādins*

atarlitopasthitameta śarīram
citram jananam sukṛbaduḥkhajatanāḥ
kalasya talena yathabhūghato
na buddhipurvo sthityabhīmānaḥ ||

All this has come into existence by accident—the various joys and sorrows of men—all this is like the striking a cow by a palm fruit which is not preceded by design. It is useless to think (that the origination of things is preceded by design).

Thus under *nasti jivah śatah* we have obtained six schools and under *nasti jivah paratah* we shall have a set of another six schools. Therefore there are obtained twelve schools under the first of seven principles and by extending the same classification to each of the other six principles we have altogether seven times twelve or eighty four schools comprised in *Akriyavada*.

Another classification of *Akriyavādins* divides them into eight classes** ८:

Ekavādins who believe in one supreme soul as the first cause

Anekavādins who believe in one supreme principle manifesting itself in several principles

Mitavādins who gave a fixed size to the soul

Nirmitavādins who regard the universe as created by God

** Sth. S. 2.3.607

*Sala adins*¹⁰⁰ who believe in obtaining mokṣa by living a comfortable life

Samuccheda-adins who believe in the constant destructibility of things

Nityaradins who believe in the eternity of things

And *Na santi paraloka ādins* who do not believe in a future life or soul etc

It will appear from the above classification that all possible non Jainā creeds have been comprised under those eight classes of *ākriyā āda* the scope of which is certainly wider than in the previous classification into eighty four classes

The *Ākriyavādins* are mentioned in the texts as not admitting that the action of the soul is transmitted to future moments¹⁰¹ and as holding that nothing exists and all forecasts of the future are false¹⁰²

3 Ajnanavada

The *Ajnanatadins* deny the necessity or importance of knowledge. According to them knowledge is not the highest thing for where there is knowledge there is assertion of contradictory statements by different disputants resulting in dissensions which soul the mind and bring on a longer period of worldly bondage. But if *ajnana* or negation of knowledge is upheld it generates no pride and there is no ill feeling towards others and therefore the chances of worldly bondage are removed. The result of volition is *karman* and the result of *karman* is bondage which is of dire consequences and has to be suffered from it having been produced by resolute and determined volitional activity. But that *karman* which results from the activity of mere body and speech unprompted by mental action is not volitional and therefore is not productive of severe suffering nor does it entail dire consequences. Such unvolitional effects of *karman* are swept off easily by good activities like the easy blowing off by the wind of dust particles adhering to a very dry and white wall.

The absence of volition of mind is generated by the force of *ajnana* for where there is knowledge there is volition. Therefore one desiring *mokṣa* should adopt *ajnana* and not knowledge to lead him along the path of perfection.


See notes 90-93 and 110
 Sūtr S I xi 4
 Sūtr S I xi 10

Supposing for argument's sake that knowledge is necessary how is one to know for certain what is knowledge? It cannot be known. All philosophers differ in their idea of knowledge. We cannot say which of them spoke the truth. The followers of Mahavira may say that he obtained omniscient knowledge and therefore the knowledge that proceeds from him is right knowledge. But how is one to know in the absence of any evidence to prove it that Mahavira alone obtained omniscient knowledge and no one else? The story of the gods coming down from heaven to worship Mahavira and thus testifying to his omniscient knowledge is not to be trusted for there is no evidence to prove that it really so happened. Traditional evidence is also untrustworthy because it cannot be definitely known whether such tradition was set on foot by an imposter or a worthy man. What has not been proved cannot be believed. The phenomenon of the coming down of gods from heaven is shown by magicians also and in itself is not enough to prove the omniscience of anyone.

Granting even say the *Ajnanavadins* that Mahavira was omniscient how do we know that the *Virgrantha* scriptures are really his teachings and not circulated by knaves? How again are we to know if Mahavira used the words in the scriptures in the same sense as they are taken now? How do we know what his real intention was?

Therefore it is established that owing to its being the cause of longer bondage in the world and owing to want of definite certainty knowledge is not the highest thing but *ajñāna* is the highest thing.

There are sixty-seven schools under *Ajnanavada* obtained in the following manner. Let us take the first of the nine principles and draw a table as below.



Here *sattva* means existence in its own form. *Asattva* means non-existence in other forms. *Sadasattva* means simultaneous existence in its own form and non-existence in other forms. When such existence and non-existence are to be expressed at one and the same time in one word it becomes indescribable there being no such word and therefore it is said to be *avacyatva* indescribability. When from one point of view it is existent and from another it is indescribable and the two are to be simultaneously expressed it is called *sadaavacyatva*. When from one point of

view it is non-existent and from another it is indescribable and the two aspects are to be simultaneously expressed it is called *asadaśacjātva*. When from one point of view it is existent from another it is non-existent and from yet another indescribable and all these aspects are to be simultaneously expressed it is called *sadasadavacjātva*. Thus we have the seven schools under the first principle and extending the same classification to each of the other eight principles we have nine times seven = sixty-three schools. These refer to the nature of the nine 'principles' severally but as for their origin in general four other schools are possible: *śaśtīa asatīva śadasatīa* and *avacjātīa*—the other three forms of the seven possible variations are not used in this case as they are used only in respect of the several parts of a thing only after its origin has taken place which is not the case here. The last four added to the previous sixty-three give us sixty-seven schools under *Ajnanaśāda*.

The first school on *ñīa* for instance says: 'Who knows if there is *jīva*? No one does because there is no evidence to prove its existence. What again is the use of knowing it? If it is known it will give rise to volition which will stand in the way of attaining to the next world (*gnatasyabhinnatāhataśūloja paraloka-pralīpanthitāt*). In the same way are to be described the other varieties of *asatīa* etc. as also their origin in general.

It is obvious that although the *Ajnanaśādis* say they have no need of knowledge and that it is unnecessary they happen yet to be the employers of the acutest arguments.

4 Vinayavāda

The *Vinayavādins* or *Vinayikas* do not accept signs, external rules of ceremony and scriptures but uphold the supremacy of reverence as the cardinal virtue leading to perfection. There are thirty-two schools of *Vinayavāda* obtained in this way. Reverence may be shown to eight classes of beings: 1. god or master, 2. ascetic man, 3. aged persons, 4. inferiors, 5. mother or father, and to each of these eight classes of persons reverence may be shown in four ways: 1. e. by body, 2. mind, 3. speech and 4. gifts. There are thus four times eight or thirty-two schools of *Vinayavāda*.

The three hundred and sixty-three philosophical schools of Jaina literature are thus obtained by totalling one hundred and eighty schools of *Kriyavāda*, eighty-four schools of *Akriyavāda*, sixty-seven schools of

Ajnanavada and thirty two schools of *Vinayavada*¹⁰⁰ : The commentators Silanka Abhavadeva and Malayagiri as well as Hemacandra accept this classification as a standard

Buddhist Classification of Contemporary Schools

It is of interest to compare in this connection Buddha's classification given in the *Prakmajāla Sūtra* in the *Dīgha Nikāya* of contemporary philosophical thought into sixty two schools :—

The four schools of Eternalists or *Sassatavādas* They held that the soul and the world are both eternal. The first three schools held this view as a result of their having perceived through a recollection of the memories of past lives that the soul and the body have always been in existence and the fourth school held this view not as a result of memory but on logical grounds.

The four schools of Semi-Eternalists or *Ekacca Sassatikas* The first school believed that Brahma was eternal but not individual souls having come to this conclusion through partial remembrance of past states of existence in higher worlds. The second school believed that debauched souls are not eternal but that undebauched souls are eternal. The third school believed exactly the same thing as the second school except that in the case of the former the debauchery of the gods is mental unlike the debauchery of the gods of the latter school which is physical. The fourth school held that the soul was eternal but not the body.

The four schools of Extensionists or *Antanantikas* The first school held that the world was finite the second that it was infinite the third that it was infinite sideways but finite upward and downward and the fourth that it was neither finite nor infinite.

The four schools of Eel wrigglers or *Amaravikkhepikas* They did not give categorical replies to any question but avoided them by ambiguous and equivocating replies and differed only in respect of the motives for giving such replies.

The two schools of Fortuitous-Originists or *Adhiccasaṃuppannikas* They held that the soul and the world came into being without a cause having come to this conclusion as a result of remembrance of past lives in the case of the first and as a result of logical reasoning in the case of the second.

The thirty two schools of Conscious-maintainers or *Uddhamaghatanikas* They believed that the soul after death passed into various states of existence ¹¹ conscious or unconscious subject to decay or not subject to decay neither conscious nor unconscious and all in respect of the form finite different modes of consciousness and happiness of the soul

The seven schools of Annihilationists or *Ucchedavadis* They held that the soul is annihilated after death and they identified the soul with the body essence of the body mind infinite space infinite consciousness or ■ being bondless or being beyond ideas

The five schools of Nirvanists or *Ditthadhammansibbanaradas* They believed that a soul was capable of obtaining complete emancipation in this visible world by full enjoyment of the pleasures of the senses¹² or by each of the four stages of *dhyana*

C/ Satavādins *supra* notes 80—83 106

PART III

RELIGIOUS SECTS

Besides philosophical schools the literature of the Jainas has interesting information regarding various kinds of religious sects

A sect believed abstention from salt or garlic onion young camel's milk beef and liquors as the path of perfection¹

A sect believed in the use of cold water for bath and ablutions as the path of perfection²

Some ascetics believed that by tending a fire they would reach perfection³

Haithi jānas They used to kill an elephant with arrows and lived many months on its flesh The motive was to spare the lives of other animals for as long as the flesh of the elephant would last They claimed that they committed but one sin the killing of the elephant in a year or so which was counterbalanced by the merit earned by not killing other lives during this time⁴

Bala latasas They lived only by eating leaves that fell off naturally from trees⁵

Kandāpīyas They earned a living by performing antics and making people laugh by making various movements with the eyebrows mouth teeth lips hands feet and ears They made others laugh but did not laugh themselves⁶

Carakas They went about begging and carried a *dhastī*⁷ They went out to beg only after meal⁸ says Hemacandra in his commentary on the *Anuyogadvāra*

The names of the following sects are mentioned in long lists of ascetical orders in several places⁹

Kibbisīyas They went about speaking ill of religious teachers and holy people

Sūt 5 I vii 17

Sūt 5 I vii 12

Sūt 5 I vii 12

Bhag 5 11 9 418 Anp 38 Sūt 5 II vi 57

Bhag 5 12 25

Bhag 12 25 Anp 38

This is the explanation of Abhayadeva the word however seems to be *gṛastī* a begging bowl

Bhag 12 5 Anuvog 20 ud 76

Bhag 12 25 and 11 9 418 A p 39 and 41 Anu 29 and 28

Tericchīyas They dwelt in places unfrequented by cows horses and other animals

Abhiogias They earned a living by gaining the confidence of people by administering auspicious baths exorcising evil spirits and interpreting dreams The *Brahmajāla Sūtra* of the Buddhists also mention these as the ways by practising which many mendicants earned their living

Hottīyas They performed *agnihotras*

Pottīyas They put on a special kind of clothes

Kottīvas They slept on the bare ground

Jannais They performed *jayānas*

Thalais They carried all their belongings with them

Humrautffas They carried a water vessel with them¹²⁰

Dantukkhalīyas They lived on fruits and used their teeth as mortar

Ummajjagas They bathed by taking only a dip

Sinmajjagas They bathed without dipping in water

Nimajjagas They remained in water only for a short time

Sampakkhalas They rubbed and cleaned their limbs with mud

Uddhakandujagas They never scratched the lower parts of the body

Ahokandujagas They never scratched the upper parts of the body

Dakinakulagas They dwelt only on the south bank of the Ganges

Uttarakulagas They dwelt only on the north bank of the Ganges

Samkhadhamajas They blew a conch shell to keep people away

Kuladhamajas They blew a conch shell on the river bank to keep people away while they took their meal

Vigaluddhahas They killed animals

Jalabhiseyakiḍhinagajas They took their meals only after a bath

Amburasins They lived in water

Lawāsins They lived in airy places

Jalarasins They remained submerged in water

Bīlarasins They lived in caves

Velavasins They lived on the sea-coast

Rukkhamulīyas They lived under trees

Āmbubhakkhins They lived by drinking water only

Vāyabhakkhins They lived by inhaling air only

Śeṇalabhakkhins They lived by eating moss

Mulāhāras They lived by eating roots only

Kandaharas They lived by eating bulbous roots only

Pallaharas They lived by eating leaves only

Pupphaharas They lived by eating flowers only

Phalaharas They lived by eating fruits only

Piyaharas They lived by eating seeds only

Tayaharas They lived by eating bark only

Parisadiyakandaharas They lived by eating rotten bulbous roots only

Parisativamulaharas They lived by eating rotten roots only

Parisadiyapupphaharas They lived by eating rotten flowers only

Parisadiyaphalaharas They lived by eating rotten fruits only

Parisadiyapallaharas They lived by eating rotten leaves only

Lakkavasins They put on a dress of bark

Disapollkins They sanctified all sides by sprinkling water and then collected fruits and flowers

Uddandagas They went about with a raised staff

Coamas They earned a living by making a young bull painted and decorated perform tricks of foot lifting etc

Gobbatas They followed a cow wherever it went ate grass

Kukkuiyas They earned a living by amusing people by making many kinds of grimaces and gestures

Some sects abstained from milk curd butter oil treacles honey spirits and meat

Dagaviyas They took water as the second item in the meal

Dagalatas They took water as the third item in the meal

Dagacaulphas They took water as the fourth item in the meal

Dagapancamas They took water as the fifth item in the meal

Dagachalphas They took water as the sixth item in the meal

Dasattamas They took water as the seventh item in the meal

Mohariyas They went about saying all sorts of incoherent and absurd things also indulging in great garrulity in order to amuse people

Some sects went about dancing and singing to entertain people

Bahudayas They stopped one night in a village five nights in a town and lived on whatever alms they got

Kudittayas They lived in houses and regarded conquering of anger greed pride and illusion as their goal

Trigas They put on rags collected from the road side

Cammakharayas They put on a dress of hide

Panjuragas They besmeared their body with a hes

Bhikkhondas They would eat nothing except what has been obtained as alms and would not take milk unless it had been milked by another

Hamsas They lived in mountain caves roads hermitages temples and gardens and entered a village only for begging alms

Paramahamsas They lived on river banks the confluence of streams and wore discarded clothes and rags

Besides these there are mentions of mendicants who worshipped Narayana of eight Brahmanical mendicants named Kapila Karakaṇḍa Ambaḍa Parasara Kanha Divayaya Devagutta and Naraya of eight Kṣatriya mendicants named Sīlai Sasihira Naggai Bhaggai Viḍeḥa Rayaraya Rajarama and Bala of Samkhas (*Samkhyas*) Jois (*Jogins*) Kavilas Bhuccas (disciples of Kapila and Bhṛgu) of those who practised penances in the sun or surrounded by fire of ascetics who practised austerities with an arm uplifted¹¹ of mendicants in Vajrabhumī who ate rough food and carried a staff with them¹² of the six Disayaras named Sana Kalaṇḍa Kapiyara Acchūda Aggaveyana Ajjuna and Gomayuputta¹³

The texts mention only the names of these sects of ascetics but give no other details. The little information which is collected here is from the remarks of commentators. It is apparent that the information supplied by the latter is not full but nothing more is available.

II THE SECT OF PARŚVA

The sect of Parśva came to be amalgamated with the Nirgranthas. A discussion once took place between Goyama the chief disciple of Mahavira and Udaka a follower of Parśva on whether a movable being is to be called a movable being or beings which are for the time being movable. Udaka went on to argue that one who took the vow of abstention from killing one class of animals abstained in fact from killing all classes of animals for the same being who was now born in one class may be born in other classes as well and beings which are outside the class now may come later on into the class. To this Goyama replied at length pointing out its incorrectness on the ground that as the vow of not killing an ascetic is not broken by one who kills a man who used to be an ascetic but is no longer so in the same way all classes cannot be brought within one class.¹⁴

Bh II 1 539
Acar S 1 835
Bhag 15 679
but S II vi 14

Further among themselves the literature of the Jainas yields some information about schisms within the order of the Nirgranthas

Jamali who was Mahavira's sister's son and also married his daughter was the first man to start the schism. He was a prince and renounced the world in order to be an ascetic follower of Mahavira. Once he begged permission of Mahavira to go out on a tour with five hundred ascetics and although permission was asked three times Mahavira vouches no reply. Jamali took the law in his own hand, went away wandering and fell ill on account of having taken bad and improper food. During his illness he asked his companions to spread a bed of dry grass for him and when it was being done he enquired if the bed was ready. His companions said the bed was ready but going up to it he found that it had been only half ready. Instantly it occurred to him that a thing is done when it is being done as taught by Mahavira was false. He announced his new idea to his companions some of whom agreed with him. He thereupon declared himself a Kevalin. Jamali's followers are called Bahurayas because they held that the completion of an act required more than one unit of time. This is the first schism and it arose in Sarvathi.

The second schism was started by Tissagutta at Uvabhapura or Rayagaha. His followers are called Jī apasīyas because they identified the jiva with the space occupied by it.

The third schism was led by Āsadha and had its origin in Syetavi. Āsadha doubted if god and saints were really so. His followers are called Āśvatthas.

The fourth schism arose in Mithila and was started by Assanutta. His followers are called Samuccherias because they held that inasmuch as every thing is subject to destruction after having come into existence the effects of good or bad deeds are not to be enjoyed or suffered from.

The fifth schism was started by Canga at Ullakatura. His followers held that it is not true that only one feeling can be felt by the mind at one time and are therefore Lokīyas.

The sixth schism
Robhagutta
there is

The

ji and was started by Saḍuluya or
Terasiyas because they held that
ajiva.

at Dasapura His

followers are called *Abaddhīyas* because according to them the *jīva* is not bound by *karman* ¹²⁹

IV NIRGRANTHA CRITICISM OF OTHER SCHOOLS

The Jaina literature contains some criticism specifically directed against the beliefs and practices of some of the contemporary schools. Later commentators have read into many of the passages in the canon criticism of others by implication. These might or might not have been meant in the texts to be criticism against the parties the commentators take them to be directed against and are therefore unnecessary to deal with. But the other class wherein we find in a very clear manner the criticism made as also the party it is directed against is important as it shows from yet another point of view the stand the early Nirgranthas took in contrast with their contemporaries.

The Ājīviyas have been criticised on the ground that they do not understand that things depend partly on fate and partly on human exertion. ¹³⁰

If everything was unalterably fixed as the Ājīviyas believed and if there was no *purusakāra* how was it that the gods only were gods and not everybody? A god attained to that status by dint of his exertion otherwise all would have been gods or none would have been such. From our everyday experience we find that the course of things can be altered by human exertion ¹³¹ our reason dictates exertion which none can deny.

The Vedānta doctrine of the *atman* being the substratum of all existence is criticised on the ground that if that were true how can the consequences of evil *karman* performed by one result in the suffering of the same individual? ¹³² The one *atman* underlying all would make the consequences sufferable by all of the wrong deeds done by one or by another individual who had nothing to do with the wrong deed. Again if there were one *atman* common to all there would be no difference in the lots of individuals or in their castes or station in life and all would be sharing equally the perfection of the *atman*. ¹³³ The inactivity of the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya would also be open to the same objection of not accounting for the variety we find in the world in the lots of men ¹³⁴

¹²⁹ *Sth. S.* 73 587
¹³⁰ *Sā. S.* 1124
¹³¹ *Upās.* 7200
¹³² *Sū. S.* 11110
¹³³ *Sū. S.* 11114
¹³⁴ *Sū. S.* 11114

The soil of India has always been very favourable to the growth of religions and philosophies and the information obtained from the literature of the Jainas fully bears testimony to it. It will be seen that the teachings of Mahavira whose disciples are yet a living body in the land of their birth were an attempt on the part of the founder to provide a solution to the intense problems of religion and philosophy which stirred the heart of India in that distant age.
